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INTRODUCTION

Consultants and commentators have suggested that law firms would
benefit from the implementation of effective business management practices. 1
They assert that firms, by failing to implement management plans similar to the
plans employed by their corporate clientele, have effectively left money on the
table, and firms that utilize basic business methods are likely to experience
tremendous gains.2 In fact, one commentator went so far as to claim that “no one
factor is as important to the success of a law firm as strong leadership at the top.”3
The majority of law firms, however, have failed to take note of this and respond
accordingly. “[I]n firm after firm, either the partners will not give real authority
to anyone to lead the firm, or no partner is considered capable of assuming the
role of strong leader. This void leads firms to drift at best and fail at worst.”4
Yet despite the tremendous potential for gains, this paper asserts that the
current arrangement of power in large American firms poses a significant threat to
the extensive, dramatic, and immediate shift in the management structure of the
legal profession. More specifically, a structural conflict exists between the best
interests of the firm and the rainmaking partners, in part, because the dominant
rainmakers are both mobile and the most powerful actors within law firms, and
for the new model to be successful, these partners must surrender a significant
1

See Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Addressing Dysfunction in the Large Law
Firm, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 373, 404 (1996); see also Ward Bower, A Nation Under Lost Lawyers: The Legal
Profession at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Article: Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L.
REV. 515, 516 (1996) (“Effective management and good business practices are not inconsistent with traditional
“professional” lawyering. To the contrary, they are essential in today’s complex economic environment and will be
even more essential in the future.”).
2
See Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application of Business Methods to the Practice of Law, 38
WASHBURN L.J. 13, 15 (1998) (“most lawyers presently use few if any business methods in their practices, so that
even a small effort can make a big difference.”).
3
Carl A. Leonard, The Coming of Age of the Managing Partner as CEO, MANAGING PARTNER (Mar.
2000), available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc_ID=896.
4
Id.
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amount of power. Moreover, precisely because the new model requires that
power shift from the rainmaking partners to a centralized leader, it is unlikely that
the powerful partners will easily relinquish the authority and influence they
currently enjoy.

Consequently, those attempting to modify the firm’s

management structure, and therefore alter the distribution of power within the
firm, have the arduous task of garnering the approval of the firm’s rainmakers
since these are the lawyers who are in a position to thwart any proposed
transformation.
While this paper argues that there is a structural conflict between the best
interests of the law firm and the personal and economic interests of the firm’s
powerful, rainmaking partners, this theory likely does not apply to every AmLaw
200 firm. In particular, the most elite and prestigious firms, those comprising the
top twenty spots on The American Lawyer’s annual list, are generally immune
from this phenomenon. In fact, the application of this theory is likely limited to
firms operating under a two-tier partnership of “equity” and “non-equity”
partners. “The conventional explanation for the growth of the two-tier partnership
is that the bifurcation of the partnership increases the profits-per-partner of equity
partners, which in turn solidifies the prestige of the law firm and improves its
ability to attract the best legal talent.”5 But the most prestigious firms do not have
to adopt the two-tier model because they have already solidified themselves atop
the legal profession. Consequently, the prestigious, elite firms of the world have
little trouble attracting top-notch legal talent and the most sophisticated legal

5

See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am
Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. __ (2006).
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work.

The “have-not” firms, those that are not recognized within the legal

profession as the very best of the best, have migrated toward a two-tier structure
primarily to gain a competitive edge and retain their most valuable partners. But
these firms, by bestowing more power on their rainmakers in an attempt to retain
their valuable services, are susceptible to the problem identified in this paper.
Specifically, firms that rely too heavily on rainmaking partners will likely
experience difficulties if they attempt to migrate toward an autocratic
management structure.6
Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of Robert L. Nelson’s study
of the organizational structure and power in four Chicago law firms. Although
Part I concentrates exclusively on Nelson’s study, due to the importance of his
work regarding the composition and power within law firms, the rest of this paper
also draws extensively from Nelson’s findings. Accordingly, Part II builds upon
Nelson’s study and highlights the current structure and allocation of power within
law firms. Part III describes the “new model” for law firm management. This
model aims to maximize firm efficiency and profitability, and precisely for these
reasons, it has gained favor among law firm consultants and legal commentators.
Additionally, this section details the prominent flaws that plague the traditional
partnership model and the impetus behind the transition to the corporate
management model. Finally, Part IV details the difficulty that law firms face in
immediately implementing the new model. Specifically, Part IV focuses on the
legal profession’s general aversion to change, the various reasons dominant
6

Throughout this paper, “new model,” “autocratic,” and “corporate” are used interchangeably. These
terms, as used herein, refer to an organizational structure in which the main power is centralized in one individual,
similar to the structure of most corporations.
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rainmakers are likely to oppose an autocratic structure, and why their opposition
is fatal to such a proposal.

I. OVERVIEW OF NELSON’S STUDY
In his insightful book about power and the social transformation of the
large law firm, Robert L. Nelson asserts that the organizational structure of large
American law firms has shifted dramatically in recent decades. 7 Since their
inception, large law firms operated under traditional conceptions of a professional
partnership in which all partners were, in some sense peers, or a “company of
equals.”

8

bureaucratic

More recently, however, law firms have gravitated toward a
organizational

structure

characterized

by

“specialization,

departmentalization, and increasing stratification in the earnings and authority of
partners.”9 Because of this shift, firms have experienced greater efficiency and
undergone a notable transformation in the power structure within the firm.
In his book, Nelson studied and analyzed the organizational structure of
four Chicago law firms.

Of these four firms, two shifted to a bureaucratic

structure and two adhered to the traditional structure. Nelson’s study revealed
that the two bureaucratically-organized firms benefited from notable gains in
efficiency and productivity. According to Nelson, the increase in efficiency is
attributable to specialization.

10

Specialization in law firms is largely

characterized by lawyers working in specific departments. Nelson claimed that

7

(1987).

ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM

8

Id. at 4.
Id.
10
Id. at 25 (“[s]pecialization is the primary means for achieving greater efficiency. Given a sufficient
volume of demand for a particular service, a large firm will develop standard forms and standardized processing.”).
9
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“departmentally organized work-group structures place lesser demands on
lawyers’ time than do ill-defined collections of case teams and office
specialties.”11 In fact, according to Nelson, “[t]o compete with inside counsel and
other firms, the large law firm must become a bureaucratic work apparatus that
maximizes efficiency by coordinating the activities of diverse groups of technical
specialists or by assembling work teams capable of handling large-scale
projects.”12 After analyzing the different organizational structures utilized by the
firms in his sample, Nelson concluded that “[t]he relative efficiency of
departmental work structures suggests that bureaucratically organized firms may
have a competitive advantage in the market for corporate legal services.”13
Not only do law firms realize gains in efficiency through the establishment
of distinct practice departments, but firms also benefit from the unique division of
labor within the firm. Within each department, and indeed, throughout the entire
firm, the division of labor is an important element in maximizing efficiency.
Nelson noted that “the organization of work in the law firm is fundamentally
different from that in the industrial organization.”14 He continued:
The law firm retains a status-based division of labor in which the senior partners
use the skill, commitment, and professionalism of junior partners and associates.
Rather than seeking to reduce the level of skill in legal work, the elite firms have
actively sought to cultivate the specialized skill base necessary to attract the

11
12
13
14

Id. at 187.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 170.
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business of corporate clients in a rapidly changing and uncertain legal
environment.15
Efficiency is not the only by-product of the internal organizational shift.
“The resulting ‘new structure’ of firms is marked by the emergence of a
distinctive managerial elite, and increasing disparities in the status and income of
partners.” 16 Instead of a “company of equals,” firms are now comprised of
partners with varying degrees of power, based, in large part, on the size of a
lawyer’s “book of business.” Consequently, Nelson maintains that “a position of
managerial authority in the firm, whether it be membership on the governing
committee, a position at the head of a department, or managing partner, will
always be subordinate to the power of the lawyers controlling the largest bloc of
clients.”17 In addition to the disparities among partners, firms operating under a
bureaucratically organized system have a “new managerial ideology, which
sanctions efforts to attract clients and notable attorneys, actions that would have
been thought “unprofessional” only a few years ago, and which seeks to
reorganize the firm internally by improving efficiency and providing additional
rewards for those lawyers bringing business to the firm.”18 This new ideology
makes clear the power of the client-controlling lawyers.
Overall, Nelson recognized that the internal structure of law firms has
undergone a dramatic organizational shift, and as a result of this shift, firms are
more efficient.

15
16
17
18

One factor responsible for the increase in efficiency is the

Id. at 171.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 38.
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bureaucratic organizational structure, characterized by a hierarchical division of
labor that includes three general categories, comprised of attorneys responsible
for “finding” clients, attorneys responsible for “minding” to the needs of those
clients, and attorneys responsible for “grinding” out the actual work for these
clients. According to Nelson, “It is this status-based hierarchy that is the most
prominent feature of the organization of work [within the law firm].”19

II. THE STRUCTURE OF LARGE AMERICAN LAW FIRMS
A. Composition of the Large Law Firm
1.

Partners & Associates
To understand the importance and relevance of Nelson’s study, it is
necessary to explain more fully the basic relationship between the actors within
law firms, and their role in maximizing efficiency. The base of the law firm
pyramid is comprised of the “grinders,” which typically consist of young partners
and associates.20 According to Nelson, “Leaders of firms readily admit that they
buy associates’ time “wholesale and sell it retail,” making the work of associates
an important source of surplus for the partnership.”21 At the top of the pyramid
are the “finders.” These are the rainmakers; the lawyers responsible for attracting
new clients. 22 These lawyers are the dominant colleagues in the firm, and

19
20
21
22

Id. at 188.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
See e.g., Michael D. Freeborn, Reining the Rainmaker, 85 ILL. B.J. 231 (1997)
Everyone in the village has toiled long and hard. The soil has been turned, the seeds
have been planted, the sun has shown brightly – perhaps too brightly. Now the
ground is parched and cracking. All we need is a little rain. With a rainmaker, the
harvest might be plentiful. Without a rainmaker, the village might starve. Everyone
else has done their job well. Now, if only someone could make rain.
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typically, they can dictate the ideology by which the firm is governed.23 Hence,
for obvious reasons, the quest among associates to become a partner is
exceedingly competitive.24

a)

Internal Pressures and Rewards
Unlike previous decades, a young lawyer cannot simply work hard and
expect to succeed by rising up the ranks of a large law firm. Associates who
employ such a strategy will undoubtedly exit the firm before becoming partner.
To make partner, it is imperative that a young associate develop a book of
business.

Increasingly, law firms are placing more emphasis on client

development and control in making partnership decisions.25 In fact, those who
fail to cultivate their own relationships with clients can, no doubt, expect to be a
casualty of the “up or out” system.26
Even if an associate is fortunate enough to make partner, the pressures and
demands are not likely to cease. A prominent example of the continued stress that
accompanies one to the partnership ranks is the demotion of almost ten percent of
Sidley & Austin’s partners in late 1999.27 In an effort to improve profits, Sidley’s
management team demoted about 35 partners who failed to perform at a level
they previously maintained.28 The unexpected demotion of so many partners sent

23

See NELSON, supra note 7, at 79-80.
See Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990) (detailing the “tournament” among
associates to make partner in a law firm).
25
MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE B IG
LAW FIRM 30 (1991) (noting that in the 1960s, “[p]artners were chosen for proficiency, hard work, and ability to
relate to clients. But in many cases there was some consideration of the candidate’s ability to attract business….”).
26
See id. at 28 (“One of the basic elements of the big firm is the “up-or-out” rule, which prescribes that
after a probationary period the young lawyer will either be admitted to the partnership or will leave the firm.”).
27
Amada Ripley, Seniority Complex, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, June, 2000, at 83.
28
See id.
24
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a clear message to the remaining partners and associates: “Pull your weight, or
you’ll lose your heft. And that means the demotions achieved at least one goal,
by jump-starting all the attorneys.”29
To avoid a similar fate, it is crucial for partners and associates, alike, to
develop their own book of business. Because, “[i]n the law firm the power of the
dominant colleagues derives from their relationships with clients.” 30 Thus, a
lawyer lacking a significant book of business is susceptible to the decisions of the
most powerful partners.
Aside from job security, client-control is a considerable determinant of
compensation within the firm.

Nelson discovered that “[t]he distribution of

income follows a strikingly common pattern across the four firms: the
overwhelmingly powerful predictors of income differences are seniority and
client responsibility.”31 In fact, even more recently, law firms have shifted toward
a compensation structure that increasingly rewards a lawyer’s ability to bring in
new clients and create business over any other factor.32 Consequently, due to the
incentives to bring in business, lawyers are encouraged to divert a substantial
amount of effort toward rainmaking activities. And because managerial power
and client responsibility are positively correlated, a lawyer with a substantial book

29

Id.
NELSON, supra note 7, at 227.
31
Id. at 191.
32
Altman Weil, Report to Legal Management: Partner Compensation Systems – How Firms Distribute
Owner Profits (James Wilber ed. 2000) (noting that business organization and client responsibility are two of the
most important factors considered by firms when making compensation decisions).
30
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of business is best positioned to succeed within the firm, whether as a partner or
an associate.33

B. Client Control: The Source of Financial & Managerial Power
For better or for worse, virtually all power within a law firm derives from
client control.34 This is a prominent theme throughout Nelson’s book.35 “At the
top of the decision-making pyramid on any case or matter is the colleague with
the strongest links to clients….”36 This decision-making pyramid solidifies the
firm’s internal hierarchy by allocating a great amount of power and a major
portion of the profits to the lawyers with substantial client responsibility. 37
Consequently, even a cursory examination of the structure of and power within
law firms reveals the significance of client control.
Precisely because rainmakers are the most powerful actors in large law
firms, commentators are suggesting that young associates treat their careers like a
small business, and develop methods to attract clients.38 This is intensifying the
competition among young lawyers, and even older partners, who realize that if
they don’t develop the skills necessary to bring in business, they are likely to find
33

See NELSON, supra note 7, at 227 (noting that client-control trumps any position on the management

committee).

34
See id. at 217, 224 (“[a]ttaining client responsibility is viewed as a professional achievement” and
“[b]ureaucratization in the law firm will always be subject to the prerogatives of the client-responsible elite.”); see
also Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, Competition, and the Evolution of Firm Culture: The Case of
Law Firms, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061, 1067 (2001) (recognizing that firms are reallocating income in favor of partners
with loyal client bases, which is often combined with a consolidation of management in the hands of these same
lawyers).
35
See generally NELSON, supra note 7, at 208, 227 (noting “[t]he firm is a kingdom; the lords are those
who control clients.”).
36
Id. at 227.
37
See id. at 275 (“Whether recognized formally by changes in the partnership agreement or not, many
firms consist of a dual partnership in which lawyers with substantial client responsibility run the firm and take home
a major portion of the profits while other lawyers function as little more than salaried staff.”).
38
See Holmes, supra note 1, at 408-409 (noting that “a principal of one of the largest legal recruiting firms
in the country counsels new lawyers to concentrate on becoming rainmakers, because doing so will give them the
greatest flexibility – initially within their firms and, later, elsewhere.”).
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themselves out of a job. Lawyers who can establish and cultivate relationships
with clients realize more power than their non-client-controlling colleagues, in
part, due to increased mobility.

“Over the last two decades, aggressive

application of the principle of client choice, [which allows clients to change
lawyers or law firms at any time], has greatly enhanced lawyer mobility and made
lateral movement of lawyers among firms an accepted part of the culture of the
legal profession.”39 And the trend toward lateral hiring is no longer confined to
associates – it now applies to all levels of partnership. 40 This has had an
incredible effect on the profession, in part, because it has greatly amplified
competition among law firms. 41 “Increasingly, competition is internalized as
firms recognize that their current partners pose a significant competitive threat for
the future.”42 The intensity of the internal competition is so fierce because, as one
name partner in a large Chicago law firm said, firms tend to “deify their so-called
rainmakers.”43 According to this lawyer, “A week does not go by without some
headhunter calling me to say that he knows of a rainmaker in another firm,
interested in moving.”44 Consequently, an unhappy lawyer who has a “portable
practice” can leave with his clients and go in search of greener pastures.45

39

Hillman, supra note 34, at 1062.
See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 1:2 – 1:4 (1997)
41
Id.
42
Id. For an insightful view on internal competition among senior associates, see Bruce MacEwen, The
Law
Breeds
Immature
Business
People,
Adam
Smith,
Esq.,
available
at
http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/archives/2004/08/the_law_breeds.html (Aug. 9, 2004) (“The economic logic is
simple: Senior associates who develop a loyal book of business are in a vastly superior bargaining position vis-a-vis
their firm than their client-less peers. They can, without boasting, let it be known they could take their business
elsewhere if they aren't anointed partners.”).
43
See Freeborn, supra note 22, at 231.
44
Id.
45
See HILLMAN, supra note 40, at § 1:1 (“[I]ncreased mobility has permitted lawyers with the ability to
transport clients and revenues to demand a larger share of firm income. Bolstering the unsatisfied partner’s
40
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For all of the aforementioned reasons, dominant rainmakers have been
able to exert a tremendous amount of influence on issues relating to firm
management. Specifically, dominant rainmakers have been able to reallocate firm
income in their favor, 46 and dictate the governance of the firm. 47 Indeed, the
partners who control the most important clients are well-positioned to continue to
wield a colossal amount of influence on virtually all aspects of the firm. In
particular, because the firm relies so heavily on the clients these partners control
and the revenue they generate, it is unlikely that the firm could experience a
significant managerial shift without the endorsement and cooperation of these
powerful partners.

III.

LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT: THE “NEW MODEL”
Although increased efficiency was a result of the shift to a bureaucratic

organizational structure, some critics claim that a more dramatic transformation is
necessary if firms wish to maximize efficiency.48 The general critique is simple:
the partnership model is outdated and inefficient.49 In the words of one observer,
“when a partnership comprises hundreds of people, many of whom barely know
one another, the partnership model of management has most likely been stretched

demands is the ever-present threat of the lawyer’s leaving and “grabbing” what many regard as the firm’s assets – its
clients.”).
46
See Hillman, supra note 34, at 1067.
47
See NELSON, supra note 7, at 79-80 (“The dominant colleagues, the “finders,” typically can dictate the
ideology by which the organization is governed.”
48
See Holmes, supra note 1, at 375 (arguing that, to increase efficiency, “firms should break new ground
by replacing partnership with a more rational management structure and changing (and lowering) attorney
compensation”).
49
See JAY W. LORSCH & THOMAS J. TIERNEY, ALIGNING THE STARS: HOW TO SUCCEED WHEN
PROFESSIONALS DRIVE RESULTS 52 (2002) (“In a rapidly changing environment, yesterday’s strategy is seldom the
answer to tomorrow’s problems. This is obvious, yet time and again firms maintain the status quo (or make halfhearted efforts at strategic change), even in the face of large-scale upheaval in client needs or competitive
dynamics.”).
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beyond its useful limits.”50 Thus, to succeed, large law firms must abandon the
partnership model, which is based on consensus, not efficiency, and utilize the
corporate model of management. This, observers claim, will allow firm leaders to
establish the vision and general direction of the firm, thereby increasing overall
efficiency and productivity.51 Moreover, observers maintain that firms that fail to
recognize the benefits of the new model will likely discover their strategic
misfortune only after it is too late.52 Although sound in theory, and certainly not
impossible, this paper cautions that such a dramatic shift in the management
structure of the large law firm will be a difficult and arduous task, in part, because
firms rely so heavily on the clients these partners control and service.
Accordingly, in an effort to appease and retain their most important lawyers, firms
have showered these individuals with a significant degree of power and
autonomy. This power and autonomy, however, makes it extremely unlikely that
the partners will quickly and easily surrender these hard-earned benefits.

A. Forces Driving the Change
Initially, it is helpful, and almost certainly necessary, to detail the forces
driving the need for law firms to abandon the traditional partnership model and
adopt the corporate model. Although not an all-encompassing list, these factors
are, arguably, the most prominent.

50

Holmes, supra note 1, at 405.
See id. at 407 (noting that the use of professional managers is likely to “yield a successful quality
initiative – vision and overall direction provided at the top of the organization, with responsibility (and authority) for
operating decisions delegated to smaller groups”).
52
LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 51 (“The financial impact of strategic obsolescence may not be
fully apparent for years.”).
51
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1.

Increased Competition for Clients
Despite decades of resistance, it is now generally recognized that the
practice of law is, undoubtedly, a business. 53 Much of the force behind this
realization is the intense competition for clients.

Generally, the increased

competition is attributable to two principal factors: (a) intense competition for
lawyers and (b) new competition from nontraditional providers of legal services.

a)

Competition for Lawyers
Over the past few decades, the number of lawyers has grown
dramatically.54 Consequently, there is greater competition for clients.55 As the
previous section on rainmakers explained, the competition is generally
internalized now that firms recognize that their “current partners pose a
significant competitive threat for the future.”56 There are two main factors that
contribute to the fierce competition for lawyers. First, in contrast to past decades,
clients are no longer married to a firm. As evidenced by the accepted practice of
lawyer mobility, client loyalties run to individual lawyers, not the firms for whom
the lawyers work.57 Thus, lawyers with their own substantial book of business are
highly sought after by other law firms.58 The second, and more obvious reason
that competition for lawyers is so fierce is that “[t]alent is a [law firm’s] only
53

Shawn W. Cutler & David A. Daigle, Using Business Methods in the Law: The Value of Teamwork
among Lawyers, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 195, 195 (2002) (“the contemporary practice of law may be best
understood structurally as both a competitive business practice and a noble profession.”).
54
See Susan S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons from Management
Theory, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 645, 653 (1990); see also Susan S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffee, A Statistical Analysis of Law
Firm Profitability, 70 B.U.L. REV. 185, 189 (1990) (“Between 1960 and 1985, the number of lawyers in the United
States more than doubled -- from 285,933 to 655,191, increasing at almost twice the rate of the general
population.”).
55
See Samuelson, supra note 54, at 653.
56
Hillman, supra note 34, at 1062.
57
See id.
58
See id. at 1065–1066.
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sustainable source of competitive advantage.” 59 According to Jay Lorsch and
Thomas Tierney, within a law firm, “[t]he people you pay are more important
over time than the people who pay you.”60 Consequently, to achieve and maintain
greatness, firms must attract and retain stars lawyers, who, in turn, attract and
retain clients and other stars as well. 61 But this is an arduous task, because
“[b]uilding [star talent] begins with the competition for stars, which has seldom
been fiercer.” 62

Therefore, because their financial wellbeing depends on

successfully attracting and retaining star lawyers, the most profitable firms will
likely devote considerable time and effort to this all important task.

b)

Emergence of Nontraditional Competition
In addition to the fierce competition for lawyers, the legal market in
general has become more crowded. Not only must firms continue to compete
with other law firms for clients, but now they are faced with the added problem of
“nontraditional competition” from other professional service providers. 63 This
increased competition “has given the consumer the opportunity to shop among the
various professions for many of the services that have been traditionally provided

59

LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 64–65 (“[Star talent] is what can create a firm’s enduring
competitive edge.”).
60
Id. at 64.
61
See id. at 65.
62
Id. at 65.
63
See Stephen P. Gallagher, How Should Law Firms Respond to New Forms of Competition?¸52
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1049–50 (2002); see also Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the
Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 699, 699
(2000) (“lawyers are being forced to react to external market pressures by non-lawyers offering quasi-legal services
or multidisciplinary practices.”).
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by attorneys.”64 Consequently, the current market for legal services is undeniably
a “buyer’s market.”65
In the new market, “the client drives the price, delivery and efficiency of
legal services.”66 Accordingly, to survive and succeed in this market, firms must
be innovative and have strong, competent leadership.67

2.

Increased Client Sophistication & Demands
As a result of the current “buyer’s market,” clients are well-positioned to
demand better, cheaper service, in part, because they are more sophisticated. In
fact, “client sophistication has contributed to the growth of in-house law
departments, which have considerably changed the relationship between lawyers
and clients.”68 With the advent and proliferation of in-house legal departments
and nontraditional legal service providers flooding the market, clients are able to
dictate the cost and manner in which legal services are delivered.

Indeed,

“[c]orporate clients, seeking to control the cost of legal services, regularly
challenge the decisions of their law firms as to the requisite volume, quality and

64

Gallagher, supra note 63, at 1050; see also Susan S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffee, A Statistical Analysis of
Law Firm Profitability, 70 B.U.L. REV. 185, at 189.
65
See F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The Buyer’s Market and the Need for Law Firm Leadership,
Creativity, and Innovation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147, 148 (1994) (describing buyer’s market as a market in which
“lawyers and most of the services they offer are plentiful, buyers have a wide range of choice, and prices should be
low.”).
66
Gallagher, supra note 63, at 1050.
67
See Davis, supra note 65, at 148 (suggesting that “law firms that are creative, innovative, and possess
good leadership will prosper in comparison with other firms.”); see also Gallagher, supra note 63, at 1051
(“Confronted with new competitive and market challenges, lawyers across the country face a critical choice: either
wait and see what happens to demand for traditional legal services, or anticipate the changes certain to affect their
future and act now to shape the direction of these new services.”).
68
Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV. 515, 520 (1996).
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cost of legal resources.”69 Consequently, “partners in U.S. law firms are anxious
about their economic prospects.”70
The new realm of client sophistication is evidenced by E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Co.’s “Dupont Legal Model.” 71

Essentially, DuPont and other

corporations following this model use “fewer law firms and other legal-related
service providers, develop a close relationship and a detailed playbook with them,
then measure results to determine best practices.”72 Before adopting this model,
DuPont worked with more than 350 law firms; now, they use just 41. 73 For
DuPont, at least, the benefits are tremendous. The company enjoys increased
control over the firms it employs, and this control translates into a better bottom
line. By exerting control over price and how legal services are delivered, DuPont
saved $8.8 million in legal bills in 2002 alone.74
Collectively, these factors have contributed to the new legal marketplace.
A marketplace in which the “[b]argaining power has shifted from law firms to
clients….”75 Hence, the need for competent leadership is greater than ever for
firms that want to survive in today’s competitive legal market, because it is quite
clear that they cannot “grow and prosper simply by engaging in “business as
usual,” nor can they “manage” their way around the current challenges.”76
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The emergence of the buyer’s market for legal services seems to render
the partners with significant client contacts even more valuable to their firm than
they were in the past. That is, because the competition for clients is so fierce, law
firms can ill afford to lose lawyers who control a sizeable book of business.
Consequently, unless the market reverts to a seller’s market, which, by all
accounts, is extremely doubtful, the prospect of adopting the new model will
become increasingly difficult.

B. The Structure of the New Model
In their article about law firm management and democracy, David
Bradlow and Murray Silverman claim that “the traditional partnership form of
organization is incompatible with the successful formulation and implementation
of strategy.”77 According to Bradlow and Silverman, the partnership approach to
decision making within law firms is plagued by a number of significant flaws and
inefficiencies. First, the partnership model is “cumbersome and plodding.” 78
Bradlow and Silverman discovered that some groups take several months to
decide trivial matters.79 Additionally, “groups tend to be political”80 and often
“strive for consensus more than for organizational efficacy.”81 Moreover, group
decision making is extremely costly,82 and this organizational structure is likely to
stifle entrepreneurship, which requires “decisiveness, risk taking, creativity and
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intuition, all of which tend to be throttled in a committee environment.” 83
Overall, Bradlow and Silverman assert that the lack of leadership associated with
the traditional partnership model “will result in uncoordinated efforts,
factionalism and poor morale, all of which will impede the firms’ progress.”84
The solution, they declare, is the centralization of a significant degree of
authority in the hands of an individual responsible for making key policy and
strategy decisions.85 This, they assert, will allow the manager to respond quickly
and make better decisions.86 As this section will detail, Bradlow and Silverman
are not alone in advocating for this organizational transformation.
Another commentator simply stated, “The partnership structure by which
virtually all large law firms still are governed is outmoded.” 87

“Today,

partnership often is an empty formalism which serves little purpose beyond
helping to maintain the fiction that large law firms are professional associations,
and not businesses.”88 This commentator, Deborah Holmes, suggested a “new
model,” which calls for law firms to “replace their partnerships with a rational
management structure designed to maximize efficient client service and lawyer
satisfaction.” 89

Like Bradlow and Silverman, Holmes recognized that the

traditional managerial structure of large firms poses several dangers for firms and
attorneys.90 “First, relegating decisions to partners all but ensures the mediocrity
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of those decisions. Anticipating and solving problems, not strategic thinking, is
attorneys’ stock-in-trade.” 91 Second, firms fail to provide firm managers with
training in management skills or time to manage because management takes up
time that could be spent attracting clients and practicing law.92 Therefore, firms
that promote their “most experienced lawyers to management positions [which
they most often do] means that instead of spending time on what they do best,
these lawyers will spend time on something for which they are likely to have no
talent.”93
Accordingly, Holmes claims that law firms should hire a professional
executive to make decisions that have a firm-wide impact. 94 This new model
“would place responsibility and authority for setting the firm’s overall direction in
the hands of someone who could be expected to provide leadership and vision.”95
“Moreover, under the suggested approach, authority for day-to-day decisionmaking would devolve down to the local level, where it belongs.”96
Holmes claims that “[d]elegating responsibility to professional managers
will help to eliminate poor law firm management techniques.” 97 Under this
approach, the client-controlling partners would no longer dictate management
decisions. Instead, a trained executive with significant decision-making authority

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
See id. at 403 – 404.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.

20

would improve firm efficiency and the quality of life for many attorneys, by
allowing those attorneys to do what they do best – practice law.98
Due to the possibility for increased efficiency and productivity, a number
of consultants have acknowledged the inherent benefits of the new, corporate
model. One consultant, Carl Leonard, observed that strong leadership at the top
of a law firm is the most important factor to that firm’s success.99 He cautioned,
however, that lawyers are often poor choices for that important position. 100
“Unfortunately, the very ingredients that go into making a great lawyer are the
antithesis of the qualities found in successful business leaders.”101
Similarly, Bruce MacEwen has dedicated a number of posts on his web
log to issues of firm management, and in particular, to the benefits of the new,
CEO-style model. According to MacEwen, the ever increasing complexity and
competitiveness of the legal profession compels law firms to pay considerable
attention to issues of management.102 Firms can no longer afford to be run by
“enthusiastic amateurs,” i.e., “lawyers in their non-billable moments.”103
In one post, MacEwen posits that clients will be the driving force behind
the migration toward an autocratic management structure.104 He explains that the
biggest single complaint clients have is that lawyers don’t really understand their
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business. 105

In addition, MacEwen speculates that the reason for client

unhappiness is attributable to a structural problem with the legal profession.106
By structural, MacEwen means that “the qualities that make for the crème de la
crème of the legal profession – extraordinary thoroughness, a focus on spotting all
the issues, exhaustive research, a high degree of risk aversion, an utter inability to
risk being wrong – are pretty much a short catalog of all the qualities a successful
businessperson will not embody.”

107

But, according to MacEwen, the

introduction of a central leader at the head of a law firm will alleviate these
problems by forcing the executive to stop thinking like a lawyer and start thinking
audaciously. This, in turn, will allow lawyers to be lawyers, and focus on what
they do best, serving their clients.108
A recent article detailing Bingham McCutchen’s merger strategy exposed
some of the benefits that can derive from the implementation of an autocratic
management structure.109 At Bingham, there is no doubt that the power lies with
the firm’s Chairman, Jay Zimmerman.110 “Bingham McCutchen…is run as close
to a corporate model as any Am Law 100 firm.”111 In fact, “[i]ts leader runs the
firm like a CEO of a Fortune 500 company, and makes no apologies for it.”112
This model has worked extremely well for Bingham in recent years, as the firm’s
revenues more than tripled from 1999 to 2003, and the firm has rocketed up the
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AmLaw 100 list.113 The new corporate model has allowed Bingham to operate in
a decisive fashion, avoiding the pitfalls that often plague firms operating under
the partnership-democracy model.

In fact, the corporate model was largely

responsible for Bingham’s recent merger activity and impressive growth.114 Yet,
Bingham is somewhat of an anomaly because the firm was able to draw its
chairman from its own ranks. According to most consultants, lawyers are often
ill-equipped to successfully manage a firm in the corporate sense, thus this
increases the difficulty of finding and installing a successful CEO.115
In sum, consultants and commentators have embraced the “new model” as
the management structure of the future. They claim that firms must implement
this structure in order to better address client demands and succeed in today’s
competitive legal market. According to some commentators, firms that adopt this
structure are best positioned to realize gains through strategic planning and
efficiency,116 and those that don’t risk becoming obsolete. But as the next section
will detail, those advocating for this managerial shift are likely to encounter
substantial resistance from a number of fronts; the strongest of which will emerge
from the faction of lawyers that is absolutely crucial to the new model’s success –
the firm’s rainmaking and star partners.
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IV.

OBSTACLES TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CORPORATE MODEL
This “new model” is not without flaws. Even Holmes acknowledges that

significant challenges exist that might impede the adoption of such a system.117
Despite the gains in efficiency and profitability that are likely to result from the
adoption of the “new model,” there are significant barriers to the widespread and
immediate implementation of this organizational model. Specifically, the legal
profession, in general, is highly resistant to change. Consequently, a drastic
management transformation is bound to be difficult. Moreover, the new model is
in direct conflict with the current power distribution within the law firm, thus the
powerful partners have an incentive to oppose its adoption.

A. Resistance to Change
“The legal profession has long embraced an ironic contradiction: lawyers
help clients respond to or create change, yet at the same time lawyers steep
themselves in tradition and pride themselves on professional stability.”118 Only
recently have large firms altered their stance with respect to change.119 Despite
the resultant increase in efficiency that Nelson and others attribute to the
organizational transformation of law firms, firms are not dynamic organizations,
and they do not respond swiftly to changing market conditions.120 Although it is
117
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undeniable that large firms have become more efficient and more profitable since
adopting a bureaucratic organizational structure, 121 the potential for increased
efficiency and profitability still exists. 122 Nonetheless, the legal profession’s
general aversion to change remains a serious impediment to the adoption of the
corporate model.123
A prominent example of the legal profession’s resistance to change is its
long history of refusing to recognize that the practice of law is a business. 124
Even after law firms generally accepted this notion,125 they have been slow to
employ comprehensive, strategic business plans like their corporate clients. Two
scholars blamed the legal profession’s aversion to change on the inherent
characteristics of the profession. “Lawyers spend a substantial portion of their
training and working lives worshipping at the altar of precedent.

It is hard

therefore, for them to appreciate the necessity of doing things differently from the
way things have always been done.”126
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Additionally, the traditional configuration of the partnership model
inhibits rapid change within the firm. According to Lorsch and Tierney, members
of professional service firms, including lawyers in law firms, “tend to hang on to
the comfort of past practices rather than venture into uncharted territory.” 127
Combating this problem in professional service firms is that “a few progressive
leaders cannot order the troops forward; instead, the troops themselves…must
essentially vote with their feet to pursue a new strategic direction.”128 Lorsch and
Tierney continue:
In most corporations…strategic change can be instigated from the top down. Not
so at [professional service firms], where the top may be a partnership with dozens
(or hundreds) of independent practitioners. Absent a crisis, the partners tend to
stay on track and support only modest adjustments to the strategy. Innovative or
aggressive strategies rarely emerge from people who are satisfied with the status
quo.129
This problem will almost certainly continue to plague large law firms.
Until these firms recognize the benefits of the new corporate model, it is likely
that their members will eschew any attempt at change in favor of the traditional
and familiar partnership model.

B. The Legal Culture and Opposition to Non-Lawyer Professionals
Additionally, the law firm culture poses a significant impediment to the
adoption of the “new model.” Although consultants and commentators generally
recognize that law firms are in desperate need of professional administrators,130
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lawyers, quite simply, “do not respect professional managers.”131 Accordingly, it
is doubtful that lawyers will embrace a non-lawyer executive, even if such a
manager can increase efficiency. “In the highly polarized world of the large law
firm, lawyers are in charge and everyone else is grouped together as non-legal
personnel.”132 Therefore, if the legal profession widely adopts the new model, the
leaders of firms are likely to be lawyers, not non-lawyer professionals. One
reason is that the privileged culture of the legal profession is instilled in lawyers
while in law school. “In law school, lawyers are led to believe that what they are
learning is very important, very difficult and very special….

By contrast,

therefore, every other profession…becomes less important, less difficult, and less
special. This makes it difficult for lawyers to have respect for, or consult with,
professional managers.”133
In fact, “[a]ttorneys generally are far more comfortable with other lawyers
at the helm of law firms. Non-lawyer managers often are suspected by firm
members of being unable to understand the pressures of practicing law and,
therefore, their mandates may be accorded little credence.” 134

Indeed, the

chairperson of one AmLaw 100 firm went so far as to say that the implementation
of a non-lawyer manager at the head of a firm would be an “utter disaster.”135
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Consequently, this general lack of respect for non-lawyer professionals will likely
impede the implementation of the non-lawyer CEO in law firms.

C. Opposition from Dominant Rainmakers
Finally, and most importantly, the likely failure of law firms to adopt the
“new model” is attributable to the composition of these firms. Since firms are
comprised of different factions of powerful partners whose primary focus remains
on servicing their own big ticket clients, there is little incentive to adopt a
comprehensive, strategic business plan like their corporate clients. As rational
actors, these powerful partners have every incentive to maintain the status quo. In
fact, a shift from the current power and compensation structure to the “new
model” would punish rainmaking partners because, under the “new model,”
power is concentrated in one administrative executive, not the partners with the
biggest bloc of clients.
In their book, “Aligning the Stars,” Jay Lorsch and Thomas Tierney
explore how successful professional service firms (including large law firms)
manage and organize their star performers so that both the organization and the
stars prosper.136 They define “stars” as “the individuals who have the highest
future value to the organization, the men and women in critical jobs whose
performance is central to the company’s success.”137 “In a law firm, the partners
responsible for significant clients, practice areas, and offices are the stars.”138 But
according to Lorsch and Tierney, an organization of stars does not guarantee
success. “[E]mploying stars is necessary but insufficient. They must also be
136
137
138

LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 2.
Id. at 25.
Id.

28

aligned; that is, they must behave in ways that move the firm toward its goals,
even if this is at their own expense.”139 This, however, is no easy task.
“[T]he balance of power between the firm and its accomplished
professionals tilts sharply toward the [accomplished professionals, i.e., the
partners]. Unlike most corporations, [law firms] are highly dependent on the
retention and productivity of their senior producers.”140 Not surprisingly, these
senior producers, or rainmakers, dominate firm culture. They are capable of
dictating management decisions141 and are the best compensated attorneys in the
firm.142 These factors, combined with the reality that clients “often feel more
loyalty to individual lawyers than to firms,” 143 creates a situation in which
“lawyers with their own practices are freer to leave a firm than they ever have
been before.”

144

Consequently, unsatisfied rainmakers upset with their

compensation or the direction of the firm can take their clients to another firm.145
And because “[t]he people you pay are more important over time than the people
who pay you,”146 there is an incentive for the firm management committee, which
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is typically comprised of the dominant rainmakers, to adhere to the demands of
these powerful attorneys.147
Therefore, because firms currently reward lawyers for cultivating personal
relationships with clients, there is no incentive for lawyers to support a
management change that de-emphasizes the relationships that they have spent
years developing. In fact, the older, more senior rainmakers will be the group
most affected by a management transformation. For these partners, this new
model essentially changes the rules in the middle of the game. These powerful
partners have spent their entire careers adhering to the theory that those who
control the clients can, and usually do, dictate the direction and strategy of the
firm. But the implementation of the new model will, in all likelihood, destroy that
reality. So, unless firms can convince their dominant partners that a shift to an
autocratic structure will provide measurable benefits, these partners are likely to
oppose such a transition. In other words, the firm and its stars must align.148 But
because the firm relies on the big ticket clients that these rainmakers attract and
control, the firm faces a tremendous challenge in attempting to undertake a
complete and sudden shift in the organization of the firm.
To clarify, the reason that these partners are likely to oppose the new
system is not solely attributable to compensation issues; if money was the only
factor, it is certainly plausible that the new CEO and compensation committee
could fashion a compensation structure that would adequately pay the superstar
partners who control the big-ticket clients. On the contrary, the powerful partners
147
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are likely to oppose the new structure because it will strip them of the enormous
power they currently enjoy.
One might argue that this is a trivial reason for a group of wealthy, welleducated professionals to oppose a shift that is likely to result in tremendous
economic gains for their firm, and consequently, for them personally.
Nonetheless, this is the most prominent obstacle to the immediate, widespread
implementation of the corporate model. Big firm partners are driven, powerful,
and successful men and women.

In addition, they are, “on the whole, a

remarkably insecure and competitive group of people.” 149 Within the firm,
associates compete with each other to reach the coveted status of partner.150 For
the winners of this ultra-competitive tournament, “promotion heightens (but
doesn’t change) their fundamental need to seek fresh challenges or their equally
strong distaste for being told what to do.”151 Consequently, the thrill of the game
and the desire to compete largely explains why “sixty year old lawyers with
millions of dollars in the bank still bill 2200 hours per year.”152 At this point in
their careers, these lawyers are not competing over money. They are competing
over status and power. Accordingly, any assault on their power, which took years
of sacrifices to attain, is likely to be met with a great deal of resistance.

149

Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 905 (1999).
150
See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 24.
151
LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 94 (“Autonomy is a key component of the value proposition for
all professionals, and this is particularly true at the partner level, where the desire for independence tends to grow
exponentially with career and client successes.”).
152
Schiltz, supra note 148, at 906. For a similar discussion regarding what motivates corporate executives,
see Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1254 (2003)
(noting that “successful executives…continue to work hard long after making millions” and their main motivation
for doing so is the “excitement of “the game” and the chance to test oneself as a ‘major player.’”).

31

Bradlow and Silverman, however, suggest that any apprehension that
partners have about losing influence over the affairs of the firm is insignificant,
because in reality, the majority of the partners are already excluded from the
firm’s informal power structure.153 While it is likely true that the majority of the
partners have, indeed, been excluded from the informal power configuration of
the traditional partnership model, the dominant partners have been at the core of
that power structure, exerting their influence on virtually all issues of firm
governance. And while the majority of the partners are certainly important for the
overall success of the organization, with respect to the implementation of the
corporate model, law firms should be primarily concerned with the rainmaking
partners who have shaped the direction of the firm, and who are in a position to
leave the firm and take their big-ticket clients with them. These are the partners
who pose a serious obstacle to the implementation of the corporate model, 154
because in professional service firms, including law firms, “power is attached to
individuals as well as to positions.”155 Consequently, “power and influence are
more widely distributed among the partners of a [law firm] than they are in a
typical, large corporation with a more rigid, hierarchical structure,” 156 thereby
making a radical organizational transformation extremely challenging.
Thus, to successfully implement the new CEO model, the firm must
effectively appease the powerful rainmaking partners, because collectively, these
partners are well-positioned to wield a great deal of influence and, if they so
153
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desire, defeat any plan that calls for a drastic shift in firm power and
responsibility.

V. CONCLUSION
The relatively recent structural transformation of law firms had a
significant effect on the efficiency of these organizations. Nelson explained that
bureaucratically organized firms are more efficient than their traditionally
organized competitors.157 Yet, this structure is far from the most efficient. Some
claim that firms that adhere to the basic partnership model fail to maximize client
services and lawyer satisfaction.158 Thus, to achieve these goals, law firms should
study and implement a management structure analogous to the structure applied
by corporate America. 159 Although sound in theory, it is unlikely that such a
drastic transformation will soon take place. Under their current structure, law
firms are constrained by a culture and history that is highly resistant to change.
Therefore, it is rather doubtful that a group of professionals who have a tradition
of distinguishing their noble profession from the operation of a business, and who
have long worshipped at the altar of precedent,160 will discard their comfortable
partnership structure and quickly adopt a management structure analogous to
corporate America.
Further complicating this transition is the power large law firms have
bestowed upon the dominant rainmakers. These lawyers are the most powerful
actors in the firm, and a sudden shift to a truly autocratic, CEO-style system
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threatens to strip them of the power and high salaries they have worked so long to
attain. Moreover, observers have long recognized that the prospect of managing
hundreds of highly autonomous people, such as law firm partners, is as difficult as
“herding cats.”161 But as Lorsch and Tierney correctly recognize, “the so-called
cats that have the power – the firm’s formal leader serves to a large extent at their
pleasure.”162
Therefore, it is likely that the rainmakers and powerful partners possess
sufficient power and influence to prevent the adoption of an autocratic system in
the immediate future. This is not to say that such a management shift will not
occur. In fact, many commentators feel that firms must adapt or risk losing their
competitive edge. 163 However, this paper cautions observers and those in the
legal profession that such a drastic shift requires extensive planning and a great
amount of effort, because in the legal profession, “[t]he firm is a kingdom; the
lords are those who control clients.”164 Therefore, those who wish to successfully
implement the “new model” face the daunting task of conquering and ousting the
law firm lords.
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